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THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND AND
ITS HISTORIANS 1

I
FOR many historians with no particular expertise in the matter, the doctrines of
The Law rather resemble an impressive range of mountains. They loom
over the social landscape in every period of the past in which historians labour,
and they are undeniably im- portant. The Law Mountains are said (by those
who claim to know) profoundly to affect the intellectual climate of an age. The
frontier between state and civil society apparently runs somewhere along the line
of their peaks. Finally, one of the recognised professional duties of historians is
to track every movement of a tiny g10up of very important people. A
surprising number turn out to be lawyers, often from an elite climbing club called
The Bar. Many of these men have achieved, in past centuries, a spectacular
degree of upward mobility (itself of interest to historians) through mastering
the peculiar techniques necessary to scale the slopes of the Law Mountains. We
watch in astonishment, from the ground, as our subjects make their way up one
or another commanding height of Law (and equally, of social station).
But for most historians, that is about as close as we get. We do not know
much about the mountains,

even less how to climb them ourselves.

Occasionally one of us will try to track the route of one of those lawyermountaineers whom we usually watch from the ground. It quickly becomes
apparent that even a short walk in the Law Mountains may require an intense, if
improvised, course in technique. 2 And to ·get to the objective quickly (the

imperative for all legal climbers) one cannot linger en route to ponder the origin
of the range, or to wonder at curious rock formations and admire the goats.
But that is what the historian will want to do: understand the origins of the
mountains, their stratification, the forces that shaped them-and, incidentally, to
admire the goats. If practising lawyers are competitive climbers at heart, most
historians are contemplative geologists.
Historians tell a modern fable about the Law Mountains. It concerns an
historian-geologist who asked a lawyer-climber what he knew about them. The
lawyer's answer was (of course), "Because they are there."3 "But," persisted the
historian, "how did they get there? Why are some aspects so precipitous, others
so gentle? What's inside the Law Mountains?" The lawyer missed the point.
"We have manuals that show all the feasible routes, graded according to difficulty.
(Indeed, even each assault by members of The Bar is assessed by our most
distinguished older members.) And our Mait- land Club (few of whom actually
climb the Mountains) can show you reports on the main routes from past
centuries, and incidentally relate some marvellous tales about great men like
Coke and Mansfield who pioneered some of the best ones. Things have changed a
lot recently. Fellow-Servant Chimney, very popular in the nine- teenth century,
is now impassable. And a whole party was lost in 1924, in a rockslide started
by a silly beggar named Campbell. It quite changed this face of Old Felony."4
The historian, perhaps unwisely, stopped listening, and many decades ago
organised his fellows to tackle the Law Mountains in a less sporting way. We are
tunnelling.
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conglomerates like butter, and Old Felony in particular, which is not much
bigger than Snowdon, will be thoroughly honeycombed in the next 50 years or
so.6 As the archives are sounded, the patterns found in the records of the

hundreds of thousands of past cases for which records survive have called forth
two kinds of explanations which, although related, deal with issues of different
scale.
The first group of tentative explanations concerns the relationship between the
surfce prominencesof doctrine and the vast bulk of actual litigation decided in
the past. It runs two ways. In one direction, how far can doctrinal developments
be explained in terms of practical imperatives presented in repeated instances
before the courts, rather than simply by an evolution of earlier doctrine? In the
other, how far are peculiarities of structure in the mass of litigation explicable
by purely legal imperatives, whether of doctrine or administration? The detailed
research into the mass of past cases has also generated a second group of
explanations, directed to answering rather different questions. To continue the
metaphor briefly before abandoning it: what relationship do the Law Mountains
bear to theories of plate tectonics? What wider, converging social forces
(imperatives of the state, religious belief, purposes of different classes) threw up
these heaps of parchment and paper, made litigation so much more voluminous
in some eras than others, and gave it distinctive structures? For as we tunnel
through we find remarkable changes in the origins of cases, in their incidence,
and in their disposition, even within the last few centuries. In recent years those
patterns have been much considered by historians interested in both wider
social forces and the law.
What follows is not a review of that literature, but an attempt to explain
(with a few examples) what some historians are about. The examples are taken
from the criminal law in the period 1750-1850, and from prosecution in
particular, because that is what I know best, and also because Old Felony (and its
twin peak Misdemeanour) have been disproportionately the site of work by

historians, like myself, who are not lawyers.7 If I emphasise questions or sources
which are less familiar to lawyers, and perhaps also to some historians whose main
concern is with doctrine, there is a reason. It is to suggest, first, that the new
social and intellectual history of the law is not irrelevant to doctrine-rather the
opposite. Secondly, some of the larger hypotheses-those about plate tectonics-are
of central importance for any intellectually respectable understan9ing of law
itself, and prompt some reflections about why lawyers and historians may have
such different views of the Mountains.

II

When Sir James Fitzjames Stephen wrote his History of the Crb.ninal Law of
England (1883) he based his account of trials on the highly atypical State Trials:

atypical because they often concerned treason (with different procedural rules
from felony), committed very often by powerful people, and

tried

in

circumstances in which counsel, judges, and prisoners felt heavy pressure from
government. Until recently we had little sense of the evolution of the ordinary
criminal trial from the time of Sir George Jeffries (not to speak of the dark ages
before that) until well into the nineteenth century. By greatly expanding the
scope of research to printed records of more ordinary criminal trials, and through
exploring the manuscript records of the courts and the private papers of J.P.s
and others, not only the trial but also the preliminaries to indictment are
becoming much better understood. Much is still contentious, but some things are
clear. The ole of the private prosecutor was overwhelmingly important in practice
as well as in theory until well into the nineteenth century, even after the
introduction of the "new" police in some areas. Private Associations for the
Prosecution of Felons were extremely widespread , numbering perhaps 1,000 in

the country as a whole by the mid-nineteenth century, although they seem to
have been of particular interest to manufacturers and tradesmen, especially in the
period of their first rapid growth in the eighteenth century. Discretion in framing
the charge seems to have been widely extended to prosecutors, without much
interference by justices in spite of the Marian committal statutes. Eighteenthcentury trials are shown to have been extremely rapid by modern standards-10 or
20 serious fe.lonies in a day at times, with verdicts returned quickly by
experienced jurymen who worked closely with very active judges, a necessity
when so few criminal cases (apart from poaching and a few other offences of
largely rural significance) were heard summarily. Moreover, the eighteenthcentury trial revolved to a great extent around assessments of character. The
subsequent growth of a body of evidentiary rules, almost certainly the direct
result of the growth of a defence bar, had significantly changed the nature of
the jury trial by the early nineteenth century. A necessarily congruent
development, given the enormous increase in indictable offences from 1815 (and
probably the increasing time taken by a trial), was the eventual extension of
summary hearings on a very wide scale. From being the epitome of English
criminal law in the eighteenth century, the jury trial became the little-used
symbol of it in the nineteenth.
The role of juries changed too. In the eighteenth century, petty jury verdicts
(and prosecutorial activity) underwent significant shifts in response to wider
economic conditions and associated changes in the character of crime. Moreover,
longer-term changes in the structure of punishments during the period in which
the main capital statutes were repealed in the early nineteenth century, and the
increasing participation of police and stipendiary magistrates in the period 1750 to

1850, greatly increased the conviction rate (from 50 to 80 per cent.) and reduced
the incidence of committals not resulting in trial (from 20 to 10 per cent.).
Finally, many of the innovations effected through legislation, such as the Trials
for Felony Act (1836) and Sir John Jervis's Act regulating preliminary
proceedings (1848)8 now appear to be legislative endorsements of longer-term
developments rather than unexampled innovations. They also appear, like so
many other changes in criminal law in the early nineteenth century (and contrasting
with its stasis in the eighteenth) to be intimately involved in party differences
and wider concerns in English society. Thus the 1836 Act eventuated in part from
long debates about the humanity and justice of English law, including the
argument about capital punishment. The 1848 Act in part reflected widespread
criticism, professional and political, of the rural Tory lay bench. Both Acts also
undoubtedly reached the statute book partly as a result of a phenomenal increase
in the size of the legal profession, in the 1830s and 1840s. A great increase in
legal journalism, often critical of the status quo, and expressive of a desire to
introduce the values of self-conscious professionalism to every aspect of
prosecution and trial, had much influence on Parliament.
The greatest changes in prosecution practice occurred in the period between
1815 and the mid-1850s, when there was both the most spectacular increase in
prosecution levels since the seventeenth century, and the sharpest expression of
social division in English society since the same period. Both made the wider
connotations of criminal law, particularly in the eyes of a nascent working class,
of prime concern to the classes represented in Parliament and on the bench. And
throughout the period, many significant changes in substantive law and practice
were conditioned in large part by the sheer pressure
administrative

machinery

of justice, whether

of numbers on the

during the interruption

of

transportation during the American revolutionary war, peace-time explosions of
indictment levels, or the rapid secular rise in prosecutions in the first part of the
nineteenth century. By the 1860s, in contrast, a long secular decline in
prosecution levels to the end of the century settled the main outlines of Victorian
criminal justice as solidly as the walls of the new prisons and the newly
respectable image of the British bobby.
If changes in the law were closely connected with the incidence of prosecution,

both were shaped by much wider social forces. We are led, in other words, from
a consideration of the reciprocal relationships of doctrine and litigation to a
consideration of English society in this period. Not all accounts of the history of
prosecution, or of the law and' crime in general, attempt to describe those larger
dimensions of the context of law. I think it essential to do so. A history which
does not inquire

behind the legal process leads too easily to the doubtful

generalization that attitudes to crime,

and hence to much of the law, have

changed little if at all for centuries. One of the largest questions concerns the
different meanings that the criminal law has for the different classes making up
the social order, differing interpretations that obtained in even those periods
when stability rather than rapid change seemed to characterise the criminal law.

III

Many historians and other scholars have implicitly described the legitimacy and
authority of the criminal law as largely unproblematic. To use Stanley Diamond's
dichotomy (advanced in a wider argument), this explanation (what I shall call
Argument A), portrays law as a double institutionalisation of customary or
popular norms, a replication of pre-existing or consubstantial social values, with
per- haps a few awkward gaps between the law on the books and social practice

and belief.9 Where gaps exist, they are successively elimi- nated through
"reform." One suspects that for many English writers, this has been especially
true of England. Although the process is never quite complete, the criminal law,
according to Radzinowicz, "has always aeen sensitive to the needs and aspirations
of the English people, and it has continuously changed under the impact of the
predominant opinion of the day."10 Very few have been inclined to suggest (as
did Diamond himself in Argument B) that in many societies state law instead is
the imposition of a conquering class or a ruling class on a population that either
formerly enjoyed its own customary law, or continued to adhere to customary
mores as long as it could. In either of the latter cases state law is an
imposition, but a progressively more powerful one, that cannibalises custom,
remaking it and redefining it (when not obliterating it) in the process. More
recently, Lenman and Parker have argued that something like this happened in
Western Europe, including England, over the last thousand years. 11
The problem with both these views of the criminal law, even if applied only
to two centuries, is not simply that they are very large arguments about law for

which different historians will advance many different standards of proof,
kinds of evidence, chronologies. It is that they are very large arguments
about not only what was law, but also about its relation to social belief and
practice through whole societies over extended periods of time. And the
empirical evidence that should be brought

to bear to test such

generalisations, even for the criminal law alone, does not lie easily to
hand. Not only were large parts of the population, including those most
subject to prosecutions, not much given to publishing or otherwise
recording their thoughts (a problem acknowledged by all historians). There

is also the problem that those who did write for posterity (the enlightened
agents of legal change in the first view, the imposers of law in the second)
left far from unproblematic comments. In dealing with such a highly political
issue as law, one so charged with generating and enforcing moral meanings,
one so crucial (or so they believed) to the existing social order, they usually
gave a limited range of answers about the purposes of the criminal law and
admitted to the existence of only a limited range of questions. To frustrate
us further, they often, perhaps usually, were not conscious of the fact that
they thought within such limits, precisely because they did so.
The result is that beliefs about law in different social classes, and the way
those beliefs entered into the relations between those able to create and use law
and those largely excluded from c!oing so, are very difficult to recover. It is easy
but highly misleading to construct a version of the first side of Diamond's
dichotomy (A: "law expresses social norms") by relying on an imputation of
motive and belief (usually borrowed from literate contemporaries, or the political
prejudices of the historian) to the great majority of the population for whom
evidence is sparse. And it is easy but highly misleading to construct a version of
the second argument (B: "ruling classes impose law") by simply citing substantive
criminal law without showing how it was used, or what personal, class and
societal needs it met or failed to meet.
When we turn to eighteenth-century England, we find widespread popular
beliefs that certain customs were the embodiment of legality (in rights over land,
in artisanal practice, in wage payment, in the organisation of marketing
foodstuffs). All were increasingly under pressure from the law of the state but
by no means dead. Parts of state law in all these areas (but always in particular

instances) moved from ·a partial recognition of some custom, often through
increasingly narrow judicial definition, to legislative extinction. Often this evolution met with strong popular resistance, in particular cases, at particular times.
One must start, I think, with the assumption that state law and popular belief
shared important areas of agreement but also important areas of disagreement,
and try to chart both. And because those conflicts so often surfaced in the
criminal law (for reasons to which I shall return) any account that hopes to
explain the history of doctrine or administration cannot ignore the social
beliefs and practices that surrounded the law in action.
Broadly, there have been a number of paths by which historians have tried
to approach the relationship between state law and the belief of different classes.
Three seem to me to be the most important. One has been to examine the
records of the courts statistically to find out who was in fact using the law, for
what ends, and to what extent. A second has been to study legal proceedings
for their wider social meanings for the class that administered the law, and in
particular to illuminate the means by which an often intuitive but sometimes
overtly conscious orchestration of legal proceedings was addressed to popular
perceptions in the inculcation of a common standard of justice. A third has been
to try to reconstruct popular attitudes to particular practices on which state law
had (or developed) other definitions, and their reciprocal influences. At many
points in the development of criminal law and prosecution over this period of two
or three centuries, changes will only be fully understood when all three are taken
into account.
The most striking first finding from statistical analysis of prosecutions is that
for much of this period the total level of activity was very low indeed.
Although the court records surviving from the eighteenth century are voluminous

enough to present research problems, it appears that rates of prosecution were
markedly lower than in either the seventeenth or the nineteenth centuries.
Clearly, most Englishmen and women took their disputes to fora other than the
courts of the state. In minor civil cases they had a network of local courts (still
little understood), including courts of requests, in which lay adjudicators could
dispense with most of the procedural problems of the common law. And in both
civil and criminal matters they frequently had recourse to other laymen. One such
man, a Quaker, recorded in the autobiography he wrote for his family that in
over 40 years there had been ho formal litigation in his parish, but that he had
settled over 600 disputes. We occasionally find scattered references to other
occasions when Justices of the Peace, whose mediating role in misdemeanours
was well established, exacted public apologies, sometimes on their knees, from
transgres- sors whom the community condemned. Where popular condemnation was less likely (as in game cases) extorted apologies were more likely to be
printed in the press. One tentative conclusion, then, is that particularly in the
eighteenth

century, the costs, uncertainties (given the acquittal rate) and

punishments of the criminal law encouraged even more of an abstention from
state law than in other periods.
The statistical examination of past criminal prosecutions has also shown, in
some areas of the country in the eighteenth century, and in national totals for
the nineteenth, that prosecutions for theft (the greatest part of crime) were
closely related to larger economic changes, notably the rapid price changes for
foodstuffs that were the consequence of dearth, and the effects on employment of
export markets,

the trade cycle, wars,

conscription,

and

the

massive

demobilisation of troops. Each of these has been given much greater specificity
than before, and one general conclusion that emerges is that the pressure of

poverty can be more closely related to the incidence of crime than was
suggested in early studies, flawed by considering too few of several
simultaneously operating causes. In some periods, however short, it seems likely
that large proportions of the labouring poor experienced both sudden destitution,
and a suddenly increased possibility of feeling the direct effects of the criminal
law. A dissensus of popular norms and law seems a likely result. Against such
evidence can be constructed a "legitimacy index" based on the social class of
prosecutors. Although historians disagree on the reliability of the sources, and on
the meaning of the raw figures, as many as a fifth in theft cases in both the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were what were called "the labouring poor"
in the earlier period, "working men, operatives and labourers" in the later.
They were underrepresented as prosecutors, however, com- pared to other
classes, and much commonly appeared in court as defendants. The significance
of their use of the criminal law, whether as an instrumental recourse for the
recovery of stolen goods, the mounting of vexatious proceedings, or for other
ends, will not be adequately knowri until the sociology of more cases is also
known to us.
An important issue in the nineteenth century is whether more working-class
complainants had recourse to the courts as prosecution increasingly fell into the
hands of the police. The difficulty of disentangling the actions of complainants
from the actions of the police (who in the first half of the nineteenth century were
accused of fomenting many vexatious and malicious prosecutions in some
jurisdictions) has yet to be resolved. Our findings about the role of the police in
prosecutions in the nineteenth century are still, surprisingly, not very far
advanced. Surprising, because there is a new and extensive literature on police
organisation, on the creation of new forces between 1829 and the 1850s, and on

popular responses to them. There are important differences in response: a smooth
transition from the old parish constabulary in some areas, violent working-class
resistnce in others, especially in the north of England, where it was believed (as
was the case) that the new police were meant to implement the harsh aims of the
Poor Law Amendment Act ·of 1834. There are temporal changes as well,
including a recurrence of violence against the police in the 1860s and 1870s,
probably due to the use of constables in deterring applicants for poor relief, and
in tightening up licensing hours. In the early 1870s it was estimated that every
Metropolitan police officer would on average be injured once every two years.
The statistics, then, are suggestive rather than conclusive about popular
beliefs as reflected in use of the criminal law, both in the eighteenth century and
in the nineteenth. The figures may, in the end, tell us more about middle-class
fears: analysis of such "moral panics" as the "garrotting" episode of the early 1860s
shows the way in which police responsiveness to Press opinion could readily yield
an "increase" in serious crime. Some of the other, larger purposes which
wealthier citizens saw in the criminal law can be tracked more easily in other
sources.
One strongly-held belief was that private prosecution was an essential
constitutional safeguard against possible executive tyranny, a belief which served
to preserve in England the right of prosecution relatively unimpaired into the
twentieth century.. It is also clear that those with property and those who
administered the criminal law thought the courts most important for the
inculcation of moral values, and a belief in English justice, in a working-class
which they did not trust. In part this was to be done through attention to the
theatre of justice. A judge at all sensitive to the social importance of law is
likely to be acutely aware of this aspect of his work. Lord Devlin gave a modern

expression of it:
"The social service which the judge renders to the community is the
removal of a sense of injustice. To perform this service the essential
quality which he needs is impartiality and next after that the appearance of
impartiality. I put impartiality before the appearance of it simply because
without the reality the api:earance would not endure. In truth, within the
context of service to the community the appearance is the more important of
the two."12

That concern with sensitive vulgarisation of professional learning has its own
history. The judicial attention to appearance, especially in acting as counsel for
the undefended prisoner in this period, in pronouncing sentence of death, and in
making proclamations of the justice and mercy of state law, are.of central interest
to the historian trying to gauge popular responses to the courts. A detailed
history of prosecution is important here, particularly for noting contexts of social
distress or widespread riot. 1 The chronology of the transition from the bullying
which appears often to have been characteristic of the seventeenth-century bench,
to the widely remarked benevolent neutrality of the Hanoverian and Victorian
judiciary, is another aspect of the history of legal theatre. We must also look to
the increasing disposition of cases to lay magistrates in the early nineteenth
century, a process which some contemporaries, in the troubled 1830s and 1840s,
believed greatly weakened working-class respect for state courts because of the
casual moral brutality (literally Dickensian) characterising part of the lay bench.
Many stipendiaries, on the other hand, appear to have been acutely aware that
they were attempting to rebuild respect for the law, and some went so far as to
pretend a civil jurisdiction they did not possess, in order to overawe oppressive

landlords or employers late with wages. In those areas of the country in which
they also committed hundreds of workmen to prison in master and servant
prosecutions, their success was still greater than when justices in the trade did
so.
While the detailed symbolic histories of magistrates' courts are difficult to
recover

(although much work is being done), we know more about the

importance attributed by upper-class opinion in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries to the assizes and to their use of the death penalty. The
repeal

of

capital

punishment, often explained in terms of a disembodied

humanitarianism (expressed in parliamentary debates and in the tenderness of
juries and of prosecutors), now appears to have had more to do with developments
in doctrinal thinking on the one hand, and overt political considerations, closely
tied to a class analysis of English society, on the other. In doctrine, the rise of
formalism in important areas of private law, remarked by historians on both sides
of the Atlantic, was also part of the attack on the discretion which the judges
increasingly had to exercise in selecting a few unfortunates among the
condemned for actual execution, as death sentences increased with indictable
crime but executions clearly could not. It seemed increasingly unacceptable to
reformers like Romilly that no known rules, certainly no rules of law, governed
the exercise of the pardon, when criminal procedure and a rapidly expanding law
of evidence were observed rigorously in capital trials. The larger political
conflict, as it is analysed in a recent account of the parliamentary debates on the
capital statutes, was between two conceptions of proper authority, matching two
distinct views of the dynamics of English society. 14 On the one hand, Tories
committed to the status quo of the eighteenth-century system deplored attacks on
the capital statutes, which they argued were essential for making discriminating

use of the necessary terror of the law. On the other hand, their opponents (and
for the most part, the political opposition in Parliament) castigated the erratic
operation of the Royal Pardon, particularly under the Prince Regent, as a symbol
of the arbitrary nature of aristocratic government. They also warned that far
from holding a potentially revolutionary working class in awe, capital punishment
would harden the moral sentiments of those already depraved: the state" which
murdered, and so publicly, could expect little allegiance in return. Many of
those arguments were recapitulated, briefly, in the debates which led to the
effective end of public executions in the 1860's.
Finally, some of the most interesting work on the relationship of criminal law
and social beliefs has centred on instances of direct comparisons or reciprocal
influences between state law and popular justice. We know relatively little about
such ties, but they were ubiquitous. One cause was the degree to which the high
visibility of state justice (from the distant past) permeated popular culture as an
exemplar of the way of doing justice. Some popular justice notably the rituals of
"rough music"-appears to have remained relatively untouched in form until they
died out in the nineteenth century. The most striking opposite case, the elaborate
aping of state criminal procedure, took place among groups contaminated by very
direct contact with the courts-prisoners holding mock trials in gaols, barristers
doing the same in their circuit messes. But other reciprocal influences or
similarities between state law and extra-legal social enforcement are more
interesting. When judges and legislators ceased to believe in the maleficium of
witchcraft in the early eighteenth century, and repealed the capital statutes on
the subject in 1736, their unexampled mercy did not impress a large number of
villagers, who in many incidents in the next half-century continued to
interrogate and punish suspected witches by dragging them through ponds (with

murder charges by the state sometimes the result). On the other hand, the quick
justice of the crowd against thieves caught red-handed, usually through ducking in
a horse-trough, appears rather similar to the very rapid assessment of character
and guilt which we now know was the norm in the courts, even in trials on capital
statutes. Finally, a most interesting example of the complex relationship between
state law and popular beliefs about law, or popular justice, is that of the food riot.
It is interesting in part because it is now one of the best-studied aspects of

eighteenth-century popular culture. And the evidence from many hundreds of
instances shows that crowd action against bakers and millers suspected of
profiting from high food prices was informed by a belief that seizing food and
selling it for a "just" price, or punishing the offender more directly, was
legitimated by a long tradition of legal sanctions against such suspected exploiters of
the community. Magistrates as well as mobs agreed on the value of Tudor and
Stuart (and earlier) legislation against middle- men in food enacted to prevent·
popular disorder of threatening proportions in times of dearth. 15
It is worth pursuing this example a little further, as an illustration of the

differences between social history of law and more doctrinal legal history, even
when the

latter is written by a lawyer highly sensitive to the need for

contextual study of the legal past. It may also illustrate my contention that
much doctrine may be explicable only by following litigation to its sources.
In The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979) Patrick Atiyah i.s
concerned to construct an argument that judges, in the course of the later
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, sheared equitable protection from the
law of contract. They moved from a tradition that sometimes interfered with
agreements that were (or had become through circumstances) inequitable to
almost invariable insistence on the execution of the expressed intentions of the

parties, however imbalanced the respective benefits. In making this case he
draws on a wide range of evidence of changes in administration, attitudes
to legislation, but above all the developing ideology of a market of freely
contracting individuals, responsible for their actions, understood in the terms
of early classical political economy. There are problems with the narrative,
however, when judges behave in ways "difficult to interpret from an
economic viewpoint." One such hiccup in the judicial imbibing of free market
principles appears to be the decision of Lord Kenyon and his brothers in
R. v. Rusby and R. v. Waddington, in 180{}-1801. 16 In those cases they
emphasised that the common law crimes of buying and reselling foodstuffs for
gain or in speculative quantities, or before they came to open market
(engrossing, regrating, forestalling) . still remained after the repeal of many
of the statutes in 1772. 17 Moreover, Justices Kenyon and Grose not only
repudiated

the theories of political economy presented by counsel for the

defend- ants: they also invoked older equitable notions (and Christianity, no
less). In Rusby, Lord Kenyon said,
"It frequently becomes the duty of juries in this place to decide causes
where the interests of individuals are deeply concerned; but a more
important duty than is imposed on them today they never fulfilled: this
cause presents itself to their notice on behalf of all ranks, rich and poor, but
more especially the latter. Though in a state of society some must have
greater luxuries and comforts than others, yet all should have the
necessaries of life; and if the poor cannot exist, in vain may the rich look
for happiness or prosperity. The Legislature is never so well employed as
when they look to the interests of those who are at a distance from them

in the ranks of society. It is their duty to do so: religion calls for it;
humanity calls for it; and if there are hearts who are not awake to either
of those feelings, their own interests would dictate it. The law has not
been disputed; for though in an evil hour all the statutes which had been
existing about a century were at one blow repealed, yet, thank God, the
provisions of the common law [against forestalling],were not destroyed . .
. Speculation has said that the fear of such an offence is ridiculous; and a
very learned man, a good writer, has said you might as well fear
witchcraft. I wish Dr. Adam Smith had lived to hear the evidence of
today, and then he would have seen whether such an offence exists, and
whether it is to be dreaded. If he had been told that cattle and corn were
brought to market, and then bought by a man whose purse happened to be
lo!J.ger than his neighbours, so that the poor man who walks the street and
earns his daily bread by his daily labour could get none but through his
hands, and at the price he chose to demand; that it had been raised 3d.,
6d., 9d., ls., 2s., and more a quarter on the same day, would he have said
there was no danger from such an offence?"18
And in Waddington, where the prisoner was a large dealer in hops (held to be
foodstuffs because they were essential to brewing), Kenyon declared that
engrossing large quantities, in hopes of an exorbitant profit, "is a most heinous
offence against religion and morality, and against the established law of the
country." 19
For Atiyah, this is a paradoxical survival of an older tradition of benevolent
paternalism, especially since Parliament had repealed the statutory provisions
almost 30 years before.20 (It was a paradox that had surfaced before 1800:

Kenyon had taken the opportunity in a case in 1795 to remark that the common
law was still in effect.) Atiyah concludes, not unreasonably, that judges often
get their law, and their prejudices, fixed at an early age, and suggests that
Kenyon (who left the bench in 1802 after a long career) was simply behind the
times, uninstructed in the truths advanced by the epigoni of Adam Smith
(who indeed had compared the laws against forestalling to those against
witchcraft). 21 But the judgments, and particularly Waddington, involved more
than political economy and paternalism. Atiyah remarks that that context was
one of "acute shortage and high prices" for foodstuffs.22 It was indeed a crisis.
Food prices in 1800 and 1801 were far higher than they had been during
other periods of dearth: from early 1799 when wheat was about 6s. a bushel
it had increased 300 per cent. to over a pound a bushel in March 1801 in
most parts of the country. Vertiginously high prices were sustained throughout
1800 and 1801. Since bread made up so much of the average diet, a large part
of the population was made · destitute: no less than 40 per cent. of the
population could not have bought, unassisted, enough bread to survive even if
they had spent their entire family incomes on bread alone for the whole of
1801.23 But it was a crisis not only for the poor. Food riots were widespread
throughout the country, with the mob demanding that the authorities enforce the
common law penalties against speculators in foodstuffs, in the belief that they
were largely responsible for the dearth. Thousands of troops, by early 1801,
faced hostile crowds who in some districts conducted a virtual guerrilla
warfare against them.
Justices of the peace were hastening to make scores of exemplary prosecutions
of middlemen in food, and doing so in the most public manner, in order to
restore order. And the magistrates were acutely aware (as was the government)

that some of the troops were also disaffected, and that some food riots were
accompanied by seditious calls to emulate the French (with whom Britain
was at war) by establishing a revolutionary republic in England. It was in
these circumstances, when the discretionary use of the laws against forestallers, regrators and engrossers of food was being heavily exploited as almost
the only effective response to massive riot, that Wadding- ton's

counsel

suggested to King's Bench that they reflected mere superstition, and pressed
on the court the wisdom of Adam Smith. It is perhaps not surprising that the
judges preferred the (rediscovered) wisdom of the common law, and in their
judgments used the rhetoric of Christianity and humanity, rather than that of the
market. But the perspective of the judges was a more personal one than that,
and again it was imposed on their consciousness by events beyond doctrine
and beyond general currents of economic theory. In sentencing Waddington to
a large fine and imprisonment,

Grose J. argued that the laws against

speculation in foodstuff were not an unwarranted interference with trade in the
light of other facts: "In support of the legal freedom of trade [he said] the law
has declared, and that law has repeatedly been acted upon, that to violate the
freedom of trade by intercepting commodities on their way. to market, taking
them from the owner by force . . . or obliging them to accept a less price than
he demands, is a capital offence, for which men have forfeited their lives to the
law."24 Women too had been sentenced to death for food riots, which is what
Grose was describing, and he and his brethren had pronounced numbers of such
sentences, some of them carried out, in 1783, 1795, and 1800. If freedom of trade
had been enforced with such rigour, it seemed reasonable that it also should have
legal limits to prevent such tragedies. Grose and the other judges were
conscious that if riots could be prevented by prosecuting forestallers and

regrators and engrossers, fewer rioters would have to hang. Most important of
all, they were also aware that in the extremely disturbed circumstances of 1801,
the option of exemplary executions was increasingly fore- closed to them
because hangings could provoke more riots than they prevented. Five years
later, when prices had temporarily declined, the judges were showing much
less hostility to engrossers, and by 1819, when the post-war depression had
caused a great and pro- longed fall in agricultural prices (and when France was
defeated), it was the opinion of the best lawyers that the courts would no longer
enforce the common law penalties against middlemen in food without proof of
specific intent to raise prices.
Waddington and Rusby illustrate the value-breeding, ideological functions of
the judges, and their sense of the policy requirements of the criminal law, as
much as their traditionalism or their benevolence. Such policy considerations
permeated the administration of the criminal law, and, in this instance, perhaps
shaped (for a brief time) its doctrine. And those considerations rested, in this
instance, on the consciousness that a radically different view, both of what
was just and what was law, was held by the labouring poor. In 1800-1801,
they demanded that the courts respond to their belief that the law of England
had been properly embodied in that mass of legislation which Parliament had
repealed in 1772. Faced with riot, distress, and the threat of revolution, the
judges responded. 25 In elucidating such cases we must reconstruct not only
the doctrinal history and the wider intellectual currents .of the age, not only the
class perceptions of the bench and the differences between judges, but also the
larger histories of actual litigation and wider social context. Only then will
we illuminate the policy considerations and prejudices which are referred to so
fleetingly in the reported cases, if at all, and be able to judge the relative

autonomy of doctrine from economic theories, class strategies, and imperatives
of government. I have been able to use this example because Atiyah's account
of contract is so rich in references to wider influences on doctrine, and because
the food riot has attracted much research. On many other points the young
disciplines of social and economic history still provide little commentary, in
part because historians have been so ignorant of the chronology of legal
change. Conversely, when some scholars come to prove the autonomy (or
otherwise) of doctrine in the past, too often they have attempted to do so in
a peculiarly unconvincing way. Detailed and informed work on fine distinctions
of doctrine is placed against highly schematic, impressionistic versions of
social, economic, and political "background," derived from secondary sources
which are both dated and general. The connections

between

law

and

"context" are then remarked--or, more commonly, their absence noted, which
one sometimes suspects was the interest of the enterprise. But no historian
believes that causal relations work in such general ways, or that there is any
interest in · trying to show that they do. Without examining the specific mechanisms at the point of decision, and without knowing what the predicted,
perceived and intended ends of many decisions (perhaps at a low level of
consciousness) actually were, nothing has been demonstrated. In short, in
history there is no "background." There are only a host of forces of different
strengths, including the beliefs of different social groups, the effects of which
must be weighed in each case, and in the aggregate over time.

IV
I began with an image of the different perspectives of the lawyer and the
historian to the legal past, that of the climber and the geologist. Their sources and

their purposes differ greatly: in the case of the lawyer, a thin layer (particularly
in England) of doctrinal materials used for immediately instrumental ends; for the
historian, all surviving records of litigation, which are being searched for
temporal and structural patterns of past law. And that is but the beginning, as
some of my examples will have made clear. For historians, there can be no
privileged sources, because few questions of any wide significance can be
answered from materials, such as reports of cases, constructed for limited and
specific ends.26 Social historians in particular have taken their remit to be a
wide one: explaining the beliefs and actions of not only legislators, judges, and the
police, but of victims of crime, prosecutors, criminals, potential criminals,
spectators in court, the public who read trial accounts, the spectators at executions,
the children who lisped the oral tradition of criminal and legal folklore. To the
lawyer, who asks what possible use such an endeavour may be, or even to a
legal historian who knows how much doctrinal history is yet unwritten, such
projects may appear to confuse the central with the peripheral, to exemplify
perverse antiquarianism. Some take the view. that what 90 per cent. of the
population thought about the law, or did with it, is unproblematic or
uninteresting. When those dead men and women are invoked, it_ is as past
"public opinion" or "the people," shades who·live in limbo, like those other
unfortunate souls, the passengers on the phantom omnibus which never gets to
Clapham.

I have argued instead that popular beliefs are important to any convincing
history of past criminal law, even in some of its more detailed doctrinal
history. Social historians start from an assumption that past societies (and
present ones) are complex places in which apparently unrelated social orders

on closer inspection may show a remarkable interdependence. The connections
may be circuitous, but because they are not immediately evident does not
mean that they are not important. Tracing complex chains of causation, finding
unsuspected connections, and revealing unspoken (or at least, privileged) values
and decisions, in specific detail, is part of the historian's task. Our approach to
the courts and their decisions, and to all those involved in the administration of
justice is no different, whatever our theoretical perspectives.
Such an approach seems perverse to some lawyers because it contradicts
their own working premisses. I would reply that those premisses subvert
historical explanation. At the risk of constructing an hypostatised English
lawyer who never existed. I want to suggest some characteristics of legal
scholarship which, if transposed to study of the past, would generate histories
without depth or process. Our lawyer's handicap can be grouped under two
heads: thinking like a lawyer, and doing so in England.
By ''thinking like a lawyer" I mean certain intellectual

habits which are

purposefully honed in the course of most legal education and practice, but
which vitiate historical explanation. It is perhaps most convenient to list the
errors in historical logic that seem likely to result from each.27 Five stand out;
some are more common to the arts of advocacy, some to doctrinal analysis in
the library.
One to which I have made reference already is the fallacy of moralism. It is
implicit in any unexamined assumption that state law inscribed a moral
consensus, perhaps imperfect, but roughly the same in most social classes for
most of the recent past. Yet it is instructive to consider why most historians (of
at least this century) have been wary of using such assumptions to ground

explanation. They are acutely conscious that their own values are highly
contingent on culture and epoch, and are no guide to explaining the past. The
point is a truism, even if in practice the boundaries between the theory one
inevitably brings to research, and the personal reactions to what one finds, have
a common plane. But a corollary is that in historical explanation there can be no
privileged actors, whose values can be assumed, or dismissed, because they do
or do not appear to coincide with one's own, or a postulated consensus.
All this becomes more difficult to remember if the subject is crime, and
if the social actors are rioters and burglars as well as judges and victims. An
attempt to explain the values and acts of each in equally neutral or sympathetic
terms may seem, to a lawyer, presumptuous and wrong, because it entails an
uncommitted consideration of the meanings and uses of legal institutions. It has
been argued that for those trained in the law, the legal order becomes
ideology, that "law, and within it jurisprudence, constitutes 'a world · of its own'which the inquirer who takes legal norms, as such, as object of knowledge,
cannot but inhabit and desire to serve."28 The assertion is undoubtedly cast in
too absolute terms. But when the historian who approaches the criminal law as an
object of knowledge encounters the assumption that because state law is an
unqualified human good, its victims are self-evidently beneath serious
consideration, he suspects the moralistic fallacy on the grand scale.
Presentism, the fallacy of working from present concerns to past origins, is
anathema to historians, but necessarily half the lawyer's method.29 Whatever its
merits in finding supporting arguments for a brief, it has the effect in historical
work of writing out of the past any developments which did not survive in much
the same form into the present. Since there is little in human affairs that did so,
not even sex and hunger, it is disastrous as an intellectual method for recovering

the past. In search of origins, it tends to find false analogies which, when
stripped of context, can be made to look like their putative descendants. Where the
object of knowledge has few recognisable descendants, the search does not even
begin. Presumably that may explain (to take one example) why so little has been
written about the wider effects of the purposeful extinction, through parliamentary
enclosure Acts, of a great corpus of customary law in England over the last three
centuries, a change which has changed the meaning in England of law itself.30

The fallacy of identity appears likely to be a particular affliction of lawyers
looking at history. Training to demonstrate legal consequences from legal
causes entails the necessary assumption that legal effects usually have legal
causes, or at least that those are the main causes worth considering. It is a
presumption that must be immensely strengthened by the persuasive evidence
for some autonomy of law. and legal culture from wider social forces. But the
form of doctrinal debate is (to an historian) a pervasive form of mono-causal
explanation, in which the question of autonomy and its degree are not even
raised because the answer is assumed: new law largely is considered in
terms of the working-out of implications of old law, and awkward cases tend
to be dismissed as a residual term, rather than explained. Historians are
sometimes surprised to see such cases (and legislation) smoothly accommodated
in accounts in the doctrinal tradition. It may make them wonder if the best
efforts of the other profession are not often put to reconciling differences which
in other disciplines would call for explanation rather than reconciliation.
The assumption of legal autonomy is often closely allied to a rationalist
view of legal decision-making again conditioned by reliance on a narrow range
of sources. This, like many of the other points that occur to an historian

about legal reasoning, was one of the concerns of the legal realists, but some of
their initiatives were doomed to inconclusive results. When they tried to analyse
contemporary law the attempt was sure to be only marginally successful,
particularly in studies of judicial decision-making, for two good reasons. One
(as the reviewer of a recent biography of Frankfurter has pointed out) was
that they were themselves insiders.31 Too rigorous an application of realist
criticism could be construed as unseemly, impertinent personal criticism of
colleagues with whom the rest of their professional lives were spent. More
important was the fact that they could not read the private papers of their
subjects. Short of the confessional (and one suspects that some judges in the
confessional are as aware of exclusionary· rules there as in their
courtrooms), private correspondence, notably correspondence meant to be kept
private, is a prime source from which historians (including realists) have
considered the levels of overt intention, collective assumptions, class bias,
and professional learning (not necessarily in that order) which a bench brings to
a case, or an Attorney-General brings to a prosecution. 32 Analysis begins there,
since the exercise of power is often a profoundly calculated act, and where it
is not consciously so calculated it is enacted within a medium of often
unspoken but nonetheless powerful assumptions. Those assumptions include
implicit judgments about "proper behaviour" resting on class, interest and
ethnicity. Such assumptions often remain unexpressed, either because they
are unacceptable within the wider political culture, or simply in the belief that
knowledge is often best kept back from most people for their own good. (It is

very easy to make that rationalisation if that good is equated with the smooth
operation of the instruments of government, or the administration of justice. )33
They are particularly likely to remain unexpressed by the bench, as irrelevant
to the issue, if the dominant style of legal judgments is narrowly formalist, as
it has been in this country for well over a hundred years. In that case, as Atiyah
suggests to us, we . may be obliged to watch for instances in which judges "give
them- selves away" and reveal values, even unconscious influences, which help
them to a decision but which are concealed thereafter in the language of pure
doctrine.34
Finally, much legal reasoning is dichotomous, which in historical work can
easily lead to false dichotomous questions. It seems a likely consequence of
viewing life in terms of what can be litigated, if not in the logic of law itself.35
David Hume pointed out that to move from arbitration to litigation was to
redefine the problem, and the solution:
"Hence it is, that in references, where the consent of the parties leave the
referees entire masters of the subject, they commonly discover so much
equity and justice on both sides, as induces them to strike a medium, and
divide the difference betwixt the parties. Civil judges, who have not this
liberty, but are oblig'd to give a decisive sentence on some one side, are
often at a loss how to determine, and are necessitated to proceed on the
most frivolous reasons in the world. Half rights and obligations, which
seem so natural in common life, are perfect absurdities in their tribunal;
for which reason they are often oblig'd to take half arguments for whole
ones, in order to terminate the affair one way or another."36

Shared rights and obligations-"so natural in common life"-have found little
support in English courts in recent centuries (although divided ones, of course,
have.) The paradigm of litigation has tended to support a strong bias toward
an individualist interpretation of what are collective interests.37 When such
conflicts are mediated through criminal law, as they often have been in the
English past, then collective responses can appear, in insufficiently sensitive
legal accounts, as individual acts of deviation from an already assumed social
norm. This configuration of the two assumptions of a societal consensus and
individualist actors, orchestrated in the trial, is also a powerful reinforcement
(in criminal law) of the moralistic fallacy. Moreover, when carried into an
analysis of the social significance of the criminal law, dichotomous reasoning
leads to false questions. Was the criminal law a generator of social symbols,
or a service institution for the prosecution of crime? Did the criminal law
promote specific class interests or was it used by all social classes? Were rules
real constraints on judges or were they aspects of an orchestrated ideology
of justice? For the eighteenth century, the answer in each case is "both,"
and it is that multiplicity which constitutes much of the significance of law.38
Any scholar from another discipline, particularly those which try to view
societies in the round, will compile her own list of what appear (from such a
perspective) to be idiosyncrasies of legal reasoning. But I think they will often
in the end lead to two central tenets: that state law has both matched an
unproblematic social consensus and has exhibited a logic largely independent
of context, particularly that of economic and class interest. We are told that

it is sensitively autonomous. I suggested earlier that in fact the legitimacy

and

authority

of

the

criminal

law are often

inferred

from

an

undemonstrated social consensus, and some accounts of the legal past
tend to import equally undemonstrate assumptions of autonomy. Robert
Gordon has suggested that that is why traditional legal scholarship tends to
be highly suspicious of history in the sense in which historians tout courtpractice it: that is, of history without a prefix, committed to the
understanding of the relationships of all social belief and practice. Historians
propose to test the autonomy of the law in precisely the way they test the
autonomy of other social orders, such as religious beliefs, economic
organisation, class division-by looking purposefully for interrelations, in
specific detail, in the minds and institutions they jointly form. Gordon
argues that legal scholarship, at least in America, responds by employing a
battery of intellectual stratagems to resist any recognition of the historical
contingency of law. 9
But I suggested earlier that if an ahistorical consciousness might be an
expected result of lawyerly habits of thought, it also, at least in this country,
has indigenous causes peculiar to England. By that I meant two things.
The first is that the common-law tradition is so broad a part of the
constitutional and cultural foundations of this country that there are a host of
intimate relations between popular norms and state law, and have been for many
centuries. At least in the past, the connections do not amount to anything like
the "autonomous but sensitive" criminal law which is often proposed to us. The
social history of the criminal law shows that the relationship was instead
contradictory, shot through

with

collective values

opposed

to state law,

popular celebration of old law which the state was bent on purging, and
usually a massive avoidance of the state legal apparatus on the grounds that
it was

both

financially

rapacious

and

unpredictable. Nonetheless, when

centralised state law is so powerful and so visible, even in limited contexts, from
so early a date in the history of the kingdom, it is easy to make a premature
identification of state law and popular mores. That kind of oversimplification
is less likely when

English

law

is found

in

a context

where

elite

perceptions cannot be directly identified with national culture, in law or other
areas. The extreme case is that of the Third World, where the abrupt intrusion of
English and other European law has done much to develop paradigms of
imposed law and legal pluralism, and a sensitivity to the concealed and overt
class strategies encapsulated in law.40
common

law

inheritance bulked

But

even in countries where

the

much larger in the foundations of the

national culture, the assumption of an identity of state law and social norms is
less likely than in England to be an immediate one.
In Canada, the example I know best, encomiums to the tradition of English
law are a staple of formal occasions, and have been ever since underemployed
English

barristers

and

solicitors,

or

refugee Loyalist Americans, began

reconstructing English criminal law and practice in eighteenth-century Nova
Scotia or Upper Canada. But in Quebec, English criminal law was also the
imposition of the English conqueror in 1764 (for reasons of state justified in
terms of benevolence) on a population which was 96 per cent. French-speaking
and accustomed to Colbert's Ordinance of 1670.41 They also learned, as Lord
Devlin pointed out on another occasion, that it was often the "second-rate" and
"the blimps" from England who brought the common law to the colonies.42
More important, when they used legal arguments resting on English and

Imperial precedents, in the cause of self-government, the English response was
not congratulation

but

repression:

charges

of

sedition,

imprisonment

without recourse to habeas corpus, and within another generation the bloody
military suppression of an armed populist insurrection in which French and
Irish nationalist lawyers figured prominently as leaders. The Canadian public
prosecutorial tradition also exhibits an interesting mix of traditions, one of them
being the Imperial interest in maintaining direct colonial rule from London.43
The contribution of Scots law is probably important here too, and perhaps also
Dublin Castle's highly centralised prosecutorial system which (like its police) was
in Ireland an outcome of the determination of the British state to maintain its
rule in the face of a greatly rebellious population. 44 If some of its emigrant
lawyers probably helped to found a system of prosecution in Canada with some
similarities, other Irishmen and women carried their traditions of resistance with
them. Undoubtedly the most notorious criminal episode in Canadian history, that
of the Donnellys, had roots in blood feud endemic in those parts of Irish society
in which the state's courts were avoided like the plague, and perhaps also from
the immigrant experience in England, where Irish prisoners got short shrift from
judges in the eighteenth century, and where Irishmen were the most prominent
group involved in mutual physical violence with the "new" nineteenth-century
police.
The American influence (about which we have, typically, ambivalent feelings)
is a conflict of influences. While English law and government in Canada for
much of the !first century after 1776 were devoted to extirpating republican
and

democratic

constitutional heresy whenever it raised its head, and

respectable opinion com-monly attributed crime to contamination from the same
source (and sometimes still does), in late years American influence has affected

our view of civil liberties. Once it was based squarely enough on principles
within the English tradition (although sometimes reflecting a distinct cultural clash
between the working assumptions of French and English-speaking justices in the
Supreme Court).45 But now widespread popular views of police and criminal law
in Canada owe much to the American mass media, and at a legislative level
may have more than a little to do with our recent enthusiasm for Bills of
Rights.46
Finally, all students of our Supreme Court and our constitution are aware that
some very particular (and occasionally peculiar) conceptions of Canadian
society, politics, and federalist imperatives were to be found in the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, before it ceased to be our final court of
appeal in 1949. The experience of having a crippled domestic court which was
constantly bypassed for recourse to a body in London which decided crucial
constitutional issues, often in a single day and without written briefs, is an
important constituent of our experience of disjunctions between "law"

and

"society."47
I have trespassed on your hospitality enough, and I shall not sketch the
Amerindian,

Scandinavian,

German,

Italian,

or

Douk- habour

cultural

memories which might further condition Canadian perceptions. (Nor can I.) But
I hope I have said enough to suggest why Canadian historians perhaps are less
sure than their English counterparts that the criminal law (or other state law)
reflects in an _ unproblematic way the wider values in the past society. We are
more apt to be aware of legal transplants, imposition of law, recourse to martial
law, and the slow and contradictory way in which English law became part of
our national culture. The Third World experience, while extreme, is not wholly
alien to us. But neither am I convinced (and this is the point which prompted

my excursion into chauvinist display) that criminal law in England has always
exhibited quite so simple a relationship with cultural norms as seems sometimes to
be supposed by her lawyers.
One reason is the issue of social class, which has been of central interest to
social historians. In the New World, social class and race and ethnicity have
often been powerful reinforcing identities. But class divisions (and ethnic and
racial ones) have not been unknown in England. It seems curious that the
subject so rarely has appeared (I shall note a few significant exceptions) in the
larger scholarship of English law, when it is (if an outsider may say so) so
striking a constituent of everything English from education to health care,
from the national sense of humour to the temper of academic life. The
remarkable reticence among lawyers on the subject may not be unrelated to those
aspects of legal reasoning which I suggested help sustain professional belief in the
apolitical autonomy of law and the dangerous irrelevance of social inquiry to most
legal pursuits. But perhaps there are other reasons too, for it was not always
thus. A scholar in Great Britain could once address his students in jurisprudence in the following terms without provoking (as it might in the more
ideological climate of the early 1980s) loud denunciations of bias in education:

". . . when . . . some have great wealth and others nothing, it is necessary
that the arm of authority should be continually stretched forth, and
permanent laws or regulation made which may protect the property of the
rich from the inroads of the poor . . . Laws and governments may be
considered in this and in every case as a combination of the rich to oppress
.the poor, and preserve to themselves the inequality of the goods which
would otherwise be soon destroyed by the attacks of the poor, who if not

hindered by the government would soon reduce the others to an equality
with themselves by open violence. "48
This quotation, well known only since 1978, is from Adam Smith’s lectures on
jurisprudence in the University of Glasgow in the 1750s and 1760s. It is his
principal characterisation of the state of the. law in the second, pastoral stage of
an evolutionary model of law and society. As Peter Stein and others have
argued, Smith's explanation of social and legal change, while related to the natural
law tradition, was based in large part on what he believed was an empirical base
of observation or informed conjecture about the actions of men and women,
spontaneous or modified by custom, habit, culture: education, or vested
interest.49 But at base was economic reality, and, as he made clear in this
passage-"in this and in every case"-Smith was convinced that much of the law
of his own society was also "a combination of the rich to oppress the poor. . .
." His division of society into those two elements was a staple of eighteenthcentury usage-the poor being the labouring poor, which contemporaries
estimated to be at least half the population. 50 The social analysis of the larger
purposes of law was an equally common element of the "philosophical historians"
of the Scottish enlightenment. If the passage now brings to mind Marx rather than
a "sound" British tradition, it may be, if I read Stein correctly, that the indigenous
development of a jurisprudence grounded in social observation and analysis of
interests and classes was short lived, at least in part for ideological reasons of a
kind not entirely unfamiliar to us today.
For Smith's observation and his larger approach to law could have a different
significance in different hands, and in different circumstances. The prime
instance was Smith's disciple, James Millar, who took the social and legal theory

of the Scottish enlightenment to its most advanced point. Although no radical
democrat, being an advanced Whig was enough, by the 1790s, to ensure that his
theories would alarm Tories, one of whom 'once denounced his "democratical
principles, and that sceptical philosophy which young noblemen and gentlemen of
legislative rank carried into the world with them from his law-class, and . . .
displayed with popular zeal, to the no small danger of perversion to all those
under their influence. "51 An analysis which distinguished different interests in
society, and contested an aristocratic hegemony in government (at a point when
that influence was stronger than any time earlier in the century) was uncomfortable.
At a time when the ideologues of the status quo fought Jacobinism by
emphasising the blindness of English law to social division, having a "sceptical"
law professor do the opposite was deeply disturbing.
England's upper-class political culture was profoundly anti-Revolutionary during
the French wars and for decades thereafter, and it was in that period that Smith
and Millar's project of historical social inquiry in law was abandoned.52 If there is a
connection, we do not . yet understand its dimensions. But when an historical
school of jurisprudence once again became significant in Britain, it was anodyne
in its analysis and conservative in tendency, using history to oppose a reform
movement identified with Benthamism. Its inspiration was Savigny, in whose
work there is no hint of class, but an evocation of law as the spirit of Nation
and People. History was appealed to in the unspecific and comforting terms which
Burke had made familiar to Tory English gentlemen, as an argumentum ad

antiquitam. Savigny's own work was strongly conditioned by its conservative
political significance for Germany; it was embraced, with that of Blackstone and
Burke, as the instinctive way to think about the history of English law.53
I shall take the word of other scholars for the fact that Maine and others
swallowed that tradition of universalism, and undifferentiated social wisdom of

law, outside any social analysis. (For Maine, classes existed perhaps in ancient
Rome, but not in England--or, at least, the virtual absence of British references
in his work made it unnecessary to consider the issue).s4 The great emphasis
on the medieval period which henceforth characterised legal writing on the
history of law, and the abandonment of social inquiry in much professional
history, also helped to disinfest the history of law of a social analysis. Where it
survived, it was as subtext.
An instance was Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. He may hardly be taken as a
typical English lawyer, which is perhaps why he was also the one who wrote
the last extensive treatment of the history of criminal law in England until
the mid-twentieth century.s6 He was an indefatigable propagandist and
controversialist, as well as lawyer, historian, and judge. But undoubtedly one
thing that attracted him to the study of criminal law was his deep interest in the
issue of class politics in England. He was convinced that man's innate capacity
for evil had been dangerously inflamed in the working class. They had been
absurdly flattered by advanced democratic theorists and corrupted by
irresponsible novelists like Dickens. England, in short, faced great danger
from an ignorant and levelling democracy, and Stephen thought it only a
matter of time before the disaster of the universal franchise became a reality.
In such circumstances the criminal law, although so heavy an engine of social
ordering that it should never be used lightly, was absolutely indispensable. A
strong and enlightened leadership from men of the higher and professional
classes (and Stephen undoubtedly saw himself as one such) could be expected to
use it with care and discretion and, where necessary, harsh effectiveness.

Criminal law was of political significance, in the widest sense. s7
But Stephen was also writing within the tradition of legal evolutionism
shared by his friend Henry Maine, and probably at its height. There was a
marked equivocation in Stephen's treatment of the relationship of the criminal
law to wider social norms. On the one hand, he argued in defence of legislation
for morals that there was a general social consensus on the boundaries of good
and evil, for which the criminal law was (where its standard of proof reached) an
effective expression: "the ratio ultima of the majority against persons who its
application assumes to have renounced the common bonds which connect men
together. "s9 But the highest efficacy of the law is not simply that it expresses
such moral majoritarian sentiments-that it gives effect to predominant
opinion, especially with respect to the most serious crimes-but that it shapes
that opinion, and can help create normative majorities, if used with care:
"Even indifferent or virtuous acts will come to be condemned by the moral
sentiment of particular times and places, if the law condemns them."60 At
many points in Stephen’s treatment, t e n s io n s of that kind, arising largely
from the possibility of different class perceptions of The Good, lead him towrite a more rounded account of the law than any doctrinal exposition
could be. He emphasised, for instance, that prosecution conducted in the
form of private litigation also immensely strengthened the capacity of the
criminal law to teach moral lessons in a theatrical setting. To contemporary
suggestions that the English prosecutorial system was inefficient, he replied
that that was a necessary price to pay for the legitimacy that the mode of
prosecution conferred on the criminal law, and on the constitution, as a

whole. An efficient prosecution in the hands of the state could too easily
(even if wrongly) be identified with tyranny. The criminal law's great capacity
for obtaining consent to the social order should never be sacrificed to lesser
goals. 61
Stephen shared a belief of many social historians now studying the eighteenth
and nineteenth century that "the administration of criminal justice is the
commonest, the most striking, and the most interesting shape, in which the
sovereign power of the state manifests itself to the great bulk of its subjects." If
that was one aspect of its importance, for Stephen there was another: English
criminal procedure channelled popular passions into safe ends, inculcated virtue,_
and taught a working class dangerously close to revolution "to regard the
Government as their friend . . . ."62

v
My purpose here, and throughout, should not be misunderstood. It is not to
say that the Scottish philosophical historians, or Stephen, argued that the
doctrines and institutions of the criminal law, or all law, could be understood
only or even primarily in terms of a wider social analysis. I have mentioned them
for two reasons. The passages I have quoted contrast with many nineteenth
century (and twentieth century) accounts of law which assumed rather than
demonstrated the substantial identity of law and social consensus, an identification
which I have suggested may still be one of the larger background ideas of
much traditional legal scholarship, if rarely articulated

in explicit terms.

Secondly, and more important, they may help to explain to lawyers the interests of
social historians now studying how the criminal law worked in that same period

(roughly 1760 to 1860).
Adam Smith and Sir James Fitzjames Stephen were fascinated observers of
their own societies,63 and they were convinced that the criminal law was a central
nexus of its class divisions, and helped to sustain them. Their expression of that
conviction, however foreign to the style of much legal scholarship, is abundantly
familiar in tone to historians examining popular and elite opinion in that period.
And like Smith and Stephen, when we study the place of the criminal law in
Hanoverian and early Victorian society in daily life as well as opinion, we encounter
the issues of class, contested norms, and their problematic relationship to the
coercive power of an undemocratic state. Those issues demand exploration,
particularly of a social institution which avows that it transcends substantive
social inequality.

In this century, Adam Smith's tradition of social inquiry has been resuscitated
in some areas of legal scholarship. Journals devoted to exploring the law with
the tools of social science-the inheritors of the realist programme -- or from
more radical theoretical perspectives, have established beachheads (I am told)
in academic law. But I am also told by its practitioners that the enterprise is
regarded as one of marginal interest by most of their colleagues. Some even
attribute to it sinister purposes. 64 I hope I have explained why social historians
think an uncommitted exploration of the social functions of law to be important.
But we too are aware of a degree of wariness among the lawyers. In the fable
with which I began, there was one last warning given to the historian before
he went off to tunnel through the strata of legal manuscripts. In solemn tones,
the lawyer gave him formal notice: "Do no environmental damage. We take
conservation of the Law Mountains very seriously indeed."
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